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ABSTRACT 
Use of Incident Databases for Cause and Consequence Analysis and National Estimates. 
(December 2006) 
A.S.M. Obidullah, B.S., Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, 
Bangladesh 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sam Mannan 
 
Many incidents have occurred because industries have ignored past incidents or failed to 
learn lessons from the past. Incident databases provide an effective option for managing 
large amounts of information about the past incidents.  Analysis of data stored in 
existing databases can lead to useful conclusions and reduction of chemical incidents 
and consequences of incidents.  An incident database is a knowledge based system that 
can give an insight to the situation which led to an incident. Effective analysis of data 
from a database can help in development of information that can help reduce future 
incidents: cause of an incident, critical equipment, the type of chemical released, and the 
type of injury and victim. In this research, Hazardous Substances Emergency Events 
Surveillance (HSEES) database has been analyzed focusing on manufacturing events in 
Texas from 1993-2004.  
 
Between thirteen to sixteen states have participated in the HSEES incident reporting 
system and it does not include all the near miss incidents.   Petroleum related incidents 
are also excluded from the HSEES system. Studies show that HSEES covers only 37% 
of all incidents in the US. This scaling ratio was used to estimate the total universe size. 
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CHAPTER   I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1.  Introduction 
Incidents in chemical process industries can involve injuries, fatalities or property 
damage. Severe incidents can occur anywhere toxic and/or flammable materials are 
stored, transported or used; however, they are most common in chemical manufacturing 
or storage facilities.  
 
 An incident can be defined as “the sudden unintended release of or exposure to a 
hazardous substance that results in or might reasonably have resulted in, deaths, injuries, 
significant property or environmental damage, evacuation or sheltering-in-place[1]”.  A 
hazardous substance is defined as “any chemical, including a petroleum product, that is 
toxic, reactive, flammable, asphyxiating, or that presents a potential hazard to people, the 
environment, or property because of pressure or temperature[1].” 
 
All chemical incidents have causes and consequences. Severity of the incident depends 
on the magnitude of its consequences. The consequences of an incident could be short 
term or long term depending on the nature of the incident.  Trend analysis, cause 
analysis and consequence analysis of past incidents is an important tool in preventing the 
recurrence of similar incidents. Significant events include the Bhopal Disaster of 1984, 
which released a highly toxic gas at a pesticide facility and killed more than 2,000 
people[2]. This incident had long term consequences on human health.    
 
The Bhopal disaster resulted in an emphasis on safety management systems throughout 
the world.  In the United States, concerns over this and other incidents led to the passage 
of the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.  
 
________ 
This thesis follows the style of Process Safety Progress. 
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The EPCRA requires local emergency planning efforts throughout the country, including 
emergency notifications[3].  
 
The law also requires companies to make information about their storage and processing 
of toxic chemicals publicly available so that citizens can identify critical zones where 
hazardous releases could occur. 
 
With an increasing number of incidents, process safety has become an important issue 
for everyday operations in the process industry. The study of case histories provides 
valuable information to chemical engineers involved with safety. This information can 
be used to improve safety culture that can help in reducing incidents in the future. A list 
of some important major incidents is given below.  
 
Flixborough, England 
The incident at Flixborough, England occurred on Saturday, June 1, 1974. A 30 ton 
vapor cloud of cyclohexane exploded destroying the Nypro cyclohexane oxidization 
plant at Flixborough, killing 28 people, and injuring thirty six[4]. Other plant on the site 
were seriously damaged or destroyed and fifty three people off-site were injured. 
 
Pasadena, Texas 
A series of explosions and fires occurred in a petrochemical plant in Pasadena, Texas,   
in 1989, in a polyethylene reactor killing 23 people and injuring 130[5]. The explosion 
occurred when a seal blew out on an ethylene loop reactor releasing ethylene-isobutane. 
Eighty five thousand pounds of ethylene, isobutene, hexane and hydrogen vapors were 
released and exploded.   
 
Seveso, Italy 
In 1976, a chemical plant explosion near Seveso, Italy, resulted in the highest known 
exposure to 2, 3, 7, 8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) in a residential area.  
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An uncontrolled exothermic reaction caused the explosion, resulted in the release of an 
aerosol cloud containing sodium hydroxide, ethylene glycol, and sodium 
trichlorophenate.  
The toxic vapor cloud dispersed to six kilometers long and one kilometer wide covering 
a densely populated area. The incident did not cause any immediate casualties but thirty 
seven thousand people were exposed to the chemical and around eighty thousand 
animals died [2].  
 
Mexico City, Mexico 
In November 1984, a series of BLEVEs (Boling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) at 
an LPG Terminal near Mexico City resulted in 650 deaths and over 6,400 injuries[6]. 
The estimated property damage was $31.3 million.  The rupture of a pipeline caused 
series of BLEVEs at the LNG terminal. The emergency shutdown procedures were 
initiated too late to prevent the catastrophe.  
 
Piper Alpha 
Piper Alpha was a North Sea oil production platform operated by Occidental Petroleum 
Ltd. On July 6, 1988 a leakage of gas condensate which had built up under the platform 
ignited, resulting in a massive explosion. The entire platform was engulfed by fire due to 
the released gas. One hundred sixty seven people died during the incident, while only 62 
crewmen survived [4].    
 
Incident prevention is the key to minimizing injury to people at work. Learning from 
past incidents is an essential element in incident prevention. Use of incident databases 
for trend analysis, cause and consequence analysis, and lessons learned are an important 
approach to preventing the recurrence of incidents and overall improvement of safety 
performance. In this study, analysis of HSEES database is used to demonstrate a cause, 
trend and consequence analysis of incidents.  
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1.2.  Process Safety Management 
Releases of hazardous chemicals in processes have been reported for many years. 
Incidents continue to occur in various industries that use highly hazardous chemicals 
which may be toxic, reactive, flammable, or explosive. Process Safety Management is 
the application of management principles and systems for the identification, 
understanding, and control of process hazards to prevent process-related injuries and 
incidents. Process Safety Management is a regulation developed by the U.S. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), which intends to prevent 
catastrophic incidents. Industries and government recognize process safety management 
as an effective approach to help reduce incidents and the severity of incidents if it is 
understood and implemented as intended [5].  
 
The PSM standard has 14 major elements:  
 
•  Employee Participation 
• Process Safety Information  
• Process Hazard Analysis 
• Training 
• Operating Procedures   
• Contractor Safety    
• Pre-Startup Safety Review 
•  Mechanical Integrity  
• Hot Work Permit  
• Management of Change  
• Incident Investigations   
• Emergency Response & Planning  
• Compliance Audits  
• Trade Secrets 
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Detailed description of the PSM regulation and the requirements for each element is 
provided elsewhere [7].  
 
1.3. Incident Investigation 
Incident investigation is an element in the PSM requiring employers to investigate, 
within 48 hours, incidents which did result or could have resulted in catastrophic 
releases of covered chemicals [5].  Incident investigation is a key for the learning 
process and can prevent the recurrence of similar events. Near-miss incident 
investigation can prevent serious injuries, fatalities and damages. Incident investigation 
is a process that should find facts and not simply seek to place blame on employees.  
 
Accident investigation is like peeling an onion or, if you prefer a more poetic metaphor, the dance 
of the seven veils. Beneath one layer of causes and recommendations, there are other, less 
superficial, layers. The outer layers deal with the immediate technical causes while the inner 
layers are concerned with ways of avoiding the hazards and with the underlying causes such as 
weaknesses in the management [8].  
 
 An investigation is conducted by a team comprised of several people who are 
knowledgeable about the process involved. The composition of the team depends on the 
severity of incident and size of the plant.  The team investigates and analyzes the 
incident and develops a written report on the incident. Reports must be retained for five 
years. 
 
While incident investigation of individual incidents offer specific lessons and root causes 
of incidents, much more can be learned from analyzing the universe of incidents. The 
challenge is acquiring the incident databases, and developing the appropriate 
methodology to vet, mine, and then analyze the information. In this study, the Hazardous 
Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) database maintained by the 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) has been analyzed to 
develop conclusions regarding causes and consequences.  
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CHAPTER   II 
BACKGROUND 
 According to Trevor Kletz, “We forget the lessons learned and the accident happens 
again. We need better training, by describing accidents first rather than principles, as 
accidents grab our attention, we need discussion rather that lecturing, so that more is 
remembered; we need databases that can present relevant information without the user 
having to ask for it [9].” 
 
An incident database is a powerful tool that can help reduce future incidents. Incident 
databases contain information that can help to identify the causes of the incident, 
chemical involved, and type of incident, etc.   In the last 30 years, special attention has 
been given to database mining, designing, developing and populating databases, some 
focusing on specific region and some focusing on specific areas of interest[10].  
 
Over the past several years, chemical incidents have become a major issue for chemical 
processing plants.  A broad range of groups from industries, federal, state, and local 
government agencies, environmental groups, and concerned citizens want to learn more 
about these accidental releases. They often asked questions- where, when, and how the 
releases have occurred. Their ultimate goal is to determine why such releases occur and 
how to prevent them in the future. Past incident data have been collected by a number of 
different public and private sources to meet this large public demand for information 
about chemical releases. After the Bhopal incident in 1984, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) enacted a rule requiring each regulated facility to develop a 
Risk Management Program, which includes  detailed hazard assessment of an accidental 
release and an accident history of the last five years [11]. Approximately 15,000 
facilities were required to develop an RMP and submit it to the EPA by June 1999 [12].  
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Based on certain criteria, the Federal government started collecting  accidental release 
information,  such as the type of chemical released, industry category, and impact of the 
release (death, injury, and property damages), etc[13]. Apart from the EPA Risk 
Management Program, other federal incident databases are listed below: 
Table 1. Federal accidental release databases 
Acronym Database Lead Agency 
IRIS Incident Reporting Information System NRC 
ERNS Emergency Response Notification System EPA 
ARIP Accidental Release Information Program EPA 
HMIRS Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System DOT 
HLPAD Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accident Database DOT 
IMIS Integrated Management Information System OSHA 
HSEES Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance ATSDR 
 
Analysis of data from databases can provide effective lessons for reducing future 
incidents. A systematic approach should be used for data analysis. Several past works 
have been done on data analysis. “Novel Applications of Data Mining Methodologies to 
Incident Databases [14]”  by Anand examined a subset of data from the National 
Response Center’s (NRC) incident database focusing on fixed facility incident in Harris 
County, Texas. “Model for Multi-strata Safety Performance Measurements in the 
Process Industry [15]” by  Keren analyzed propane-related incidents in the US. There 
are numerous incidents during plant startup/shutdown, maintenance, and process upset 
time.  
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Orr and Ruckart from HSEES analyzed events during plant startup/shutdown, process 
upset, and maintenance time for 2002 [16]. The Hazardous Substances Emergency 
Events Surveillance (HSEES) system was established by ATSDR, collects and analyzes 
information about  releases of hazardous substances and publishes annual reports, and 
fact sheets, etc [17, 18].  
 
Many incidents recur not because they cannot be prevented, but because the organization 
does not perform the proper incident investigation. Due to missing data, systematic 
approach being is not often used when incidents occur at the workplace, thus we lose 
many opportunities for learning from the past  [19].  
 
The process safety incident database provides an effective tool for managing the large 
amounts of information that can help reduce future incidents.  The development of 
chemical incident databases is considered an important step in chemical incidents 
analysis. The objective of this study is to analyze the HSEES database and develop 
recommendations for the industries to prevent future incidents. This study focuses only 
on incidents in manufacturing facilities in the Texas.  
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CHAPTER   III 
METHODOLOGY 
Incidents, injuries and fatalities normally follow a pattern. This pattern can be described 
by the incident pyramid as shown in Figure 1. A number of studies have shown there is a 
statistical relationship between different incident types. At the top of the pyramid are 
incidents with the most severe consequences (injuries, fatalities, loss of production, 
property damage)[5]. Incidents with the least consequences are found at the bottom of 
the pyramid.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Incident pyramid 
 
As mentioned earlier, the HSEES database was used in this study to perform incident 
data analysis. Thirteen to sixteen participating state heath departments collect data on 
each hazardous substance release event. Information about location and industry 
involved in the release, factors contributing to the release, chemical released, victim, 
injury and evacuation information, are entered into the standardized web-based 
application system maintain by ATSDR (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry)[17].  
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Information about the hazardous substance release is collected from variety of sources 
such as records and reports of state environmental agencies, NRC (National Response 
Center), DOT (Department of Transpiration), police and fire departments, and hospitals.  
 
Hazardous substances emergency events are defined as uncontrolled or threatened 
releases of hazardous substances. Release of exclusively petroleum products are 
excluded this definition.  Events were recorded when the  amount of substance released, 
or threatened released that might have been released, needed to be removed, cleaned up, 
or neutralized according to federal, state, or local law [17]. Victims were defined as 
those individuals who suffered at least one injury or died as a result of the event. In 
counting injuries, one victim could have been more than one injury. Events were 
classified as transportation related when they occurred during transportation (surface, 
air, or water) of hazardous substances. Fixed-facility events were classified as the events 
occurring at industrial sites, schools, farms, or any other type of facility.  
 
Substances were grouped into 11 categories:  acids, ammonia, chlorine, bases, mixtures, 
paints and dyes, pesticides, polychlorinated biphenyls, volatile organic compounds 
(VOCs), other inorganic substances, and other substances[20]. The “mixtures” category 
consists of chemicals from different categories, and the “other” category consists of 
chemicals that cannot be defined into any one of the other 10 chemical categories. All 
other inorganic substances except acids, bases, ammonia, and chlorine are classified as 
“inorganic substances”.  
 
HSEES collects data from different sources in the four different files in the both 
Microsoft Excel and Access format in each year. These files are the event file, chemical 
file, injury file, and victim file. File integration technique was used for effective data 
analysis.  
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Figure 2. Database integration 
 
Figure 2 shows the file integration technique that was used for this study. The event, 
chemical, injury, and victim files for different years were first combined separately to 
get the four separate files. Then, the four separate combined event, chemical, injury and 
victims files are integrated into a single file. It was really challenging to combine the 
files, because these files contain different variables and the file formats vary. The event 
file has the unique identity (ID) for each event. But, the injury, victim and chemical file 
have repeated ID based on the number of injuries, victims and released chemicals.  
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Microsoft Access was used to separate the unique ID from these files. Integrated 
database was generated after cleaning, and transforming the variables from the 
integrated file.  
 
Incidents were classified into two categories: system interruption and system comparison 
event. Interruption events are defined as the interruption of the normal chemical 
processing procedure in manufacturing industries [16]. System interruption is considered 
any immediate cause of either system or process upset (PU), startup/shutdown (SS), 
system maintenance (ME), power failure (PF) and fire and explosion (F&E). All other 
manufacturing events except interruption events are called Comparison events.  It 
compares with interruption events in the manufacturing industries to describe the 
problem and identify potential risk factors that can be targeted for prevention [16]. 
Comparison events are found by subtracting the system interruption events from the total 
events.  
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Figure 3. Data classification and analysis 
 
This flow diagram in figure 3 describes the procedure used for data analysis. The total 
number of incidents is divided into two categories: fixed facility incidents and 
transportation incidents. Fixed facility incidents were further divided into two categories: 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing events. As mentioned earlier, manufacturing 
incidents in Texas were considered for this study. Manufacturing incidents were divided 
into two categories: Interruption and Comparison events. The incident database was 
analyzed by performing trend analysis, cause analysis, and consequence analysis of the 
manufacturing events. Finally recommendations are given to the industries based on the 
results of analysis.   
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CHAPTER   IV 
INCIDENT DATABASES 
4.1. Background 
The development of chemical incidents databases is considered an important step in 
incident analysis. Analysis of data stored in existing databases can lead to useful 
conclusions and assist chemical incident mitigation. Databases contain lot of information 
that can help to identify process safety trends, underlying causes of incidents, critical 
parts of the plant, and chemical severity, etc. Incident databases are an effective  risk 
management tool that can identify process safety weaknesses and help risk managers 
determine where special  focus should be given [21]. Chemical incident databases can be 
used as a knowledge-based system for measuring industrial safety performance [22].  A 
reactive chemical database can help to increase awareness of existing hazards and 
provide tools to reduce those hazards [23].  Special focus has been given to designing, 
developing and populating databases in the last three decades.  In spite of considerable 
efforts, several deficiencies have been reported regarding the number of incidents 
covered, as well as, the accuracy of the available information. However, experience has 
shown chemical incidents databases can be used for effective incident management, 
analyzing trend, national estimates, emergency management, reducing risk, and hazard 
analysis that can help reduce future incidents. HSEES database has been used in this 
study focusing on manufacturing incidents in the Texas.  
 
4.2. Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) Database 
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) was established by the 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) in 1990. This database is 
an active, state-based system to describe the public health consequences associated with 
the release of hazardous substances [17].  
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The database was developed because ATSDR determined that the public health 
consequences of hazardous substance releases have not been adequately characterized by 
other databases.  
During 1993-2004, 79372 events were reported from participating states. 
 
The overall goals of the project are: 
• To describe the distribution and characteristics of hazardous substances 
emergencies.  
• To document the nature of injuries and fatalities related to these events.  
• To identify risk factors associated with injuries and fatalities.  
• To identify strategies that might reduce future injuries and fatalities from the 
release of hazardous substances.  
 
Thirteen to sixteen state health departments (Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin) collected data for HSEES. 
Information about the incidents is collected from environmental protection agencies, 
police and fire departments, the US Department of Transportation, the National 
Response Center, and hospitals. Once a hazardous substance emergency has occurred 
within a participating state, the state agency notifies the health department within 48 
hours. The state health department then collects information about the emergency on a 
data collection form and enters it into a program. The data collection forms are designed 
by ATSDR. All data were computerized using a Web-based data entry system provided 
by ATSDR. 
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Principal Data Elements: 
• Time, date, and day of the week 
• Location of the incident 
• Event type (fixed-facility or transportation-related event) 
• Factors contributing to the release 
• Environmental sampling and follow-up health activities 
• Specific information on injured persons: age, sex, type and extent of injuries, 
distance from spill, population group (employee, general public, responder, 
student), and type of protective equipment used 
• Land use and population information to estimate the number of persons at home 
or work who were potentially exposed  
• Evacuation and Sheltering  
• Released material (Type of material, quantity) 
• Area/Equipment Type 
• Contingency Plan and others 
Other databases have been developed in the past several years. Different databases 
focused on different issues, such as specific region, specific incidents, etc. 
Information in the databases also varies based on their scope of work. Table 2 
compares HSEES database elements with other federal databases elements.  
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Table 2. Comparison of data elements in federal hazardous substance release 
databases (Source: EPA User’s Guide to Federal Accidental Release Databases) 
Federal Databases Data Category Data Element 
IRIS ERNS ARIP HMIRS HLPAD IMIS HSEES 
Reporting party         Event 
reporting 
information Date and time reported         
Facility name          
Facility Address        
Facility/release 
location 
Release location        
Date and time of release        
Transportation release          
Facility release          
Substance involved        
Quantity/concentration         
Affected medium            
Release  
Information 
End result/type of release          
Primary Cause        
Secondary Cause 
            
Release Cause 
Equipment information         
Deaths        
Injuries        
Evacuation          
Property damage          
Damages 
Environmental damage 
           
Stabilization and  
Control measures 
           
Notification          
Cleanup Action 
Prevention/Repairs           
General 
Remarks General Remarks 
          
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The information in the database is considered reliable because each data is verified by 
professionals through error-checking programs before entering into the main database. 
One of the important parts of the HSEES database is that the information about the 
injury and the victim is clearly defined as opposed to any other databases.   
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CHAPTER   V 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of an industrial classification system is to group industries according to 
common characteristics such that one can organize specific statistical information and to 
set criteria for deciding industrial policies.  The statistical information includes 
identifying products, services and structures, data mining, and incident investigation, etc.   
 
 
There are a number of classification schemes to identify industries such as the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC), the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS), the 1990 Census of population Industrial Classification System,  and the 
Central Product Classification (CPS), etc. SIC and NAICS are commonly used to 
classify the manufacturing industries. The Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) is a 
United States government system that classifies industries by a three or four-digit code. 
Standard Industrial Classification Codes attempt to classify industries according to 
similarities in products, services, and production and delivery systems. The six-digit 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) replaces the 1987 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC). NAICS is a new classification system developed by the 
United States, Canada and Mexico in order to make a common industrial code in those 
three countries.  
 
5.2. HSEES Industrial Classification System 
Different databases and reference tools use different classification systems to organize 
their information. HSEES use 1990 Census of Population Industrial Classification 
system along with SIC codes. This study is focused on the following industrial codes 
which are shown in the table 3:  
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Table 3. Industrial classification 
1990 Census 
Code 
Industry Group 1987 SIC Code 
192 Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical 281, 286, 289 
200 Petroleum Refining 291 
180 Plastic, Synthetic and Resin 282 
 
Further Classification of SIC Codes of these three industries are given below [24]:  
 
281 Industrial Inorganic Chemical  
• 2812 Alkalies and Chlorine  
• 2813 Industrial Gases  
• 2816 Inorganic Pigments  
• 2819 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals, Cot Elsewhere Classified 
 
286 Industrial Organic Chemicals  
• 2861 Gum and Wood Chemicals  
• 2865 Cyclic Organic Crudes and Intermediates, and Organic Dyes and Pig  
• 2869 Industrial Organic Chemicals, Not Elsewhere Classified 
 
289 Miscellaneous Chemical Products  
• 2891 Adhesives and Sealants  
• 2892 Explosives  
• 2893 Printing Ink  
• 2895 Carbon Black  
• 2899 Chemical and Chemical Preparations, Not Elsewhere Classified 
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282 Plastic Synthetic and Resin Manufacturing  
• 2821 Plastics Materials, Synthetic Resins, and Nonvulcanizable Elastom 
• 2822 Synthetic Rubber (Vulcazizable Elastomers ) 
•  2823 Cellulosic Manmade Fibers  
• 2824 Manmade Organic Fibers, Except Cellulosic  
 
291 Petroleum Refining  
• 2911 Petroleum Refining 
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CHAPTER   VI 
NATIONAL ESTIMATE 
6.1.  Introduction 
The term “National estimate” is used for combining available data bases into national 
statistics. The national estimates approach is one of the best methods for developing 
specific decision based on current data. Incident databases do not contain all the 
incidents that occurred in the US.  In this study, the term “national estimate” represents 
the total number of incidents in the US. National estimate would be found by using a 
statistically significant method.  Statistical methods are reliable because by using the 
sample data, it will produce the result that is statistically significant.   
 
The process of estimating the national estimate can be explained by different methods 
such as theory of sets, sampling adjust weight methods etc.  
 
6.2. Sampling Adjust Weight Method 
Sampling Adjust Weight Method is an effective method for estimating the total number 
incidents when some, but not all, of the incidents are included in the accident history 
database. One of the advantages of this method is that we can use only one database to 
estimate the universe size. A weight variable should be calculated for the database to be 
analyzed which contains information about the sample data.   
 
 
 
 
  
23 
 
 
Auxiliary information should be incorporated for improving precision and adjusting 
weight. The main purpose of adjusted weighting is to obtain as accurate parameter 
estimates as possible.  This weight (scaling ratio) can be used to calculate the national 
estimate by the formula given below: 
 
• National Estimate= Sample data*Weight (Scaling Ratio) 
 
6.3. Scaling Ratio Calculation 
Scaling ratio (weight) has been calculated by correlating HSEES incidents in the 
fourteen states with other auxiliary parameters such as RMP facilities, processes and 
incidents, US population, chemical workers, petroleum refining workers, and HMIS 
incidents as shown in the table 4. Linear Regression technique and weighted mean were 
used to calculate the scaling ratio.  
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Table 4. Correlation of incidents in the 14 HSEES states with other parameters                              
(Source: HSEES, RMP, and U.S. Census Bureau) 
 
 
 
HSEES RMP RMP RMP 
Popula 
tion 
Chemical 
Petroleum 
Refinery 
HMIS 
Incident 
Facilit
y 
Process Incident million Worker Worker Incident Data 
Collection 
States 
2001 
1994- 
1999 
1994- 
1999 
1994- 
1999 
Censu
s 
Burea
u 
2002 
Economic 
Census 
2002 
Economic 
Census 
2001 
Scaling 
Ratio 
Percent 
Alabama 176 238 380 37 4.3 14,303 424 209 
Colorado 196 244 283 19 4.0 7,049 0 352 
Iowa 315 987 1,014 31 2.9 6,664 153 178 
Louisiana 752 392 916 152 4.4 25,678 8,326 288 
Minnesota 356 552 711 17 4.7 8,380 0 284 
Mississippi 394 174 288 16 2.7 1,786 0 160 
Missouri 190 411 441 24 5.4 2,094 0 369 
New York 1,106 215 330 23 18.2 60,122 0 633 
N. Carolina 311 329 437 42 7.6 38,239 0 727 
Oregon 282 132 191 20 3.3 3,711 0 240 
R. Island 70 28 36 0 1.0 2,600 0 20 
Texas 2,771 1,415 2,414 192 19.7 73,833 16,872 1,249 
Washington 625 262 369 38 5.7 4,884 1,709 190 
Wisconsin 537 310 442 23 5.2 12,291 0 293 
Total 8,081 5,689 8,252 634 89 261,634 27,484 5,192 
Total for US ??? 
15,00
0 
21,000 1,478 272 840,780 62,540 15,351 
Percent US  ??? 37.9 39.3 42.9 32.7 31.1 43.9 33.8 
R squared ??? 0.52 0.74 0.65 0.73 0.70 0.79 0.71 
37.3 
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     Calculation Procedure  
• Determine all the parameters including the HSEES incidents for fourteen states 
as mention in the table for 2001. 
• Determine the parameters for US except HSEES.   
• Calculate Percentages of US (values of 14 states parameters/values for US 
parameters). 
• Calculate coefficient of determination (R2) for each parameters comparing with 
HSEES incidents. 
• Calculate scaling ratio using weighted mean formula from R2 and US percentages 
as variables.  
Linear Regression 
Coefficient of determination (R2) is calculated by using linear regression technique. 
Linear regression describes the relationship between independent and a dependent 
variable. The goal of linear regression is to find the line that best predicts Y from X. By 
minimizing the sum of the squares of the vertical distances of the points from the line, 
linear regression predicts best value. The range of the data should be carefully 
observed while a linear regression model is fit to a group of data. By using a regression 
equation to predict values outside of the given range may yield incredible results. This 
technique is known as extrapolation.  
 
Fitted linear regression model expressed by the given formula [25]:  
iXY βα +=  -------------------------------------------------------- (1) 
Y is the dependent variable (number of incident in HSEES) 
Xi is the ith independent variable (value of all other parameters) 
The coefficient of determination (R2) calculates the quality of fit. The following formula 
is used to determine the R2 
      R2 = 1- SSE/SST------------------------------------------------ (2) 
SSE is the sum of squares of errors 
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1
^

=






−=
n
i ii
yySSE ----------------------------------------------- (3) 
yi is the observed value ,   
^
yi
 is the predicted value, and  n is the number of observations 
SST is the total corrected sum of squares of the data which is expressed by the following 
formula:  
2
1 =
−






−=
n
i ii
yySST --------------------------------------------    (4) 
Where 
−
yi
 represents the average of the observed values of the dependent (target) 
variable  
R2 = 1 shows the perfect fit of the data.  
 
Weighted Mean 
 
The weighted mean is expressed by the formula given below: 
Y
YX
i
iiW


=
−
------------------------------------------------------   (5) 
Xi = US percentages 
Yi = Coefficient of determination (R2) 
W
−
= Weighted mean= Scaling ratio 
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CHAPTER   VII 
RESULTS 
7.1.  Incidents Distribution by Year  
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Figure 4. Iincidents distribution by year (Source: HSEES, 1993-2004) 
 
 Figure 4 represents the yearly fixed facility and transportation incidents. This figure 
shows that both the fixed facility events and transportation events are increasing each 
year with the exception of year 2004.  In 2004, Alabama and Mississippi did not collect 
the data for the whole year. HSEES only collects incidents from thirteen or sixteen states 
and this figure does not represent the total incident trend in the US. HSEES did not 
collect all the near misses incidents from the participating states.   
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Figure 5. Distribution of manufacturing incidents by year (Source: HSEES, 1993-2004) 
 
Figure 5 compares total fixed facility manufacturing events in all HSEES participating 
states with Texas fixed facility manufacturing events. Around 55-60% of the fixed 
facility manufacturing events occurred in Texas.  
 
7.2.  County Distribution  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
H
a
rris
Jefferson
G
alvaston
B
ra
zoria
N
ueces
O
range
Victoria
G
regg
H
o
w
ard
H
utchinson
Live
 oak
El
 paso
C
alhoun
TX County
N
o
.
 
o
f I
n
c
id
e
n
ts
 
Figure 6. Distribution of manufacturing incidents by Texas counties (Source: HSEES, 1993-2001) 
 
Figure 6 represents the county distribution of Texas fixed facility manufacturing events. 
Harris County (32%) has the highest number of incidents during 1993-2004. Texas 
counties along the gulf coast are highly industrialized and account for the largest number 
of incidents. 
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7.3. Incidents Distribution by Industry  
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Figure 7. Industrial distribution of Texas fixed facility manufacturing incidents                                 
(Source: HSEES, 1993-2001) 
 
Figure 7 represents the types of industries involved in Texas fixed facility manufacturing 
events. Most of the Texas manufacturing events occurred in the three industrial 
categories: 
• Industrial and miscellaneous Chemicals manufacturing  (IMC): SIC 281, 286, 
289 
• Petroleum and Refining (PR): SIC 291 
• Plastic, Synthetic and Resin manufacturing (PSR) : SIC 282 
It can be shown from the figure 7 that about 55%, 25%, 15% of Texas manufacturing 
incidents occurred in IMC, PR, PSR industries, respectively, during 1993-2004.  
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Figure 8. Yearly incident rate (No. of incidents/No. of facilities) of IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas 
(Source: HSSES, 1993-2004) 
 
Figure 8 shows yearly incident rate of IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas. The rate of 
incidents in the Petroleum Refining industries is definitely an uptrend.   
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7.4. Incident Distribution by Incident Type  
Table 5. Yearly distribution of events by type of incident for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas 
(Source: HSEES and U.S. Census Bureau, 2000-2004) 
Type of Incident 
Year 
No. 
Ind. 
Fac- 
ility 
Type 
Incident 
SS 
SS 
Rate 
ME 
ME 
Rate 
PU 
PU 
Rate 
PF 
PF 
Rate 
F&E 
F&E 
Rate 
Interr- 
uption 
Event 
Comp- 
arison 
Event 
2000 532 867 161 0.30 13 0.02 113 0.21 12 0.02 1 0.00 300 567 
2001 512 904 155 0.30 35 0.07 158 0.31 19 0.04 7 0.01 374 530 
2002 502 993 203 0.40 163 0.32 283 0.56 47 0.09 11 0.02 707 286 
2003 489 841 200 0.41 108 0.22 174 0.36 51 0.10 11 0.02 544 297 
2004 503 653 153 0.30 85 0.17 170 0.34 42 0.08 9 0.02 459 194 
Total 2538 
IMC 
4258 872 0.34 404 0.16 898 0.35 171 0.07 39 0.02 2384 1874 
2000 51 463 47 0.92 8 0.16 99 1.94 5 0.10 2 0.04 161 302 
2001 52 523 68 1.31 12 0.23 98 1.88 12 0.23 3 0.06 193 330 
2002 64 643 135 2.11 53 0.83 258 4.03 54 0.84 9 0.14 509 134 
2003 41 743 170 4.15 117 2.85 271 6.61 47 1.15 8 0.20 613 130 
2004 54 595 101 1.87 86 1.59 271 5.02 37 0.69 3 0.06 498 97 
Total 262 
PR 
2967 521 1.99 276 1.05 997 3.81 155 0.59 25 0.10 1974 993 
2000 89 384 40 0.45 16 0.18 75 0.84 2 0.02 1 0.01 134 250 
2001 94 334 45 0.48 14 0.15 51 0.54 3 0.03 5 0.05 118 216 
2002 102 480 108 1.06 84 0.82 156 1.53 18 0.18 5 0.05 371 109 
2003 108 487 124 1.15 78 0.72 138 1.28 23 0.21 3 0.03 366 121 
2004 91 346 93 1.02 54 0.59 87 0.96 26 0.29 2 0.02 262 84 
Total 484 
PSR 
2031 410 0.85 246 0.51 507 1.05 72 0.15 16 0.03 1251 780 
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Figure 9.  Distribution of process interruption events for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas        
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 9 represents what types of interruption events occurred in IMC, PR and PSR 
industries in Texas during 2000-2004. Process Upset events are higher in all three 
industries than any other type of events which is shown in the table 5.  Startup/Shutdown 
events are the second most common interruption events followed by Maintenance, 
Power Failure, and Fire and Explosion events in IMC, PR and PSR industries. 
Maintenance and Startup/Shutdown are often considered planned work; however, large 
number of the incidents still occurred during these times. Maintenance and 
Startup/Shutdown events mentioned here include both planned and unplanned work.  
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Figure 10. Yearly rate (No. of Incident/No. of facility) of incident in IMC industries in Texas            
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 11. Yearly rate (No. of Incident/No. of facility) of incident in PR industries in Texas            
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 12. Yearly rate (No. of Incident/No. of facility) of incident in PSR industries in Texas            
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
 
From Figures 10, 11, and 12, it can be concluded that the three types of facilities have 
similar incident trends. Process upset and startup/shutdown events show an upwards 
trend in all the three industries.    
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7.5.  Incident Distribution by Time  
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Figure 13.  Incident distribution by month for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas    (Source: 
HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 13 shows the monthly distribution of manufacturing incidents in IMC, PR and 
PSR industries during 2000-2004. There is no significant trend in figure 13.  
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Figure 14.  Distribution of incidents by day for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas                      
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 14 represents the distribution of incidents by days of week for all the three 
industries in Texas during 2000-2004. This figure shows that the numbers of incidents 
are higher in weekdays compared to weekends. Plant activities are higher during the 
weekdays as well and account for more incidents.  
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Figure 15. Distribution of maintenance events by time for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas      
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 15 represents the distribution of maintenance events by time of day. Maintenance 
events are high during 6-16 and peak during 8a.m-10a.m. Important jobs are probably 
started early in the morning, this could be the reason behind the peak incidents during 
8a.m-10a.m.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
37 
 
 
7.6. Cause Analysis 
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Figure 16. Distribution of startup/shutdown events by cause for Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical 
Industries (IMC) in Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 17. Distribution of maintenance events by cause for Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical 
Industries (IMC) in Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 18.  Distribution of process upset events by cause for Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical 
Industries (IMC) in Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 19. Distribution of power failure events by cause for Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical 
Industries (IMC) in Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 20. Distribution of fire and explosion events by cause for Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical 
Industries (IMC) in Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figures 16-20 represent the causes of the interruption events in industrial and 
miscellaneous chemical (IMC) industries in Texas during 2000-2004. Figures show  
• Equipment failure is the number one cause of incidents associated with:  
• Startup/Shutdown (52%) 
• Process Upset (73%) 
• Power Failure (53%)  
• Fire and Explosion (72%) and 
• Second most cause of Maintenance (32%) 
• Intentional or illegal acts are the number one  cause of 
• Maintenance Event(48%) and  
• second most cause of Startup/Shutdown (23%) incidents 
• Operator Error is associated with few numbers of incidents: 
• Startup/Shutdown (3%),  
• Maintenance (6%),  
• Power Failure (5%), and  
• Process Upset (5%), 
• Fire and Explosion (3%)  
• 29% of Power Failure incidents occurred due to bad weather (BW): second most 
frequent cause 
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Figure 21. Distribution of startup/shutdown events by cause for Petroleum Refining Industries (PR) in 
Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 22. Distribution of maintenance events by cause for Petroleum Refining Industries (PR) in Texas 
(source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 23. Distribution of process upset events by cause for Petroleum Refining Industry (PR) in Texas 
(source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 24. Distribution of power failure events by cause for Petroleum Refining Industries (PR) in Texas 
(source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 25. Distribution of fire and explosion events by cause for Petroleum Refining Industries (PR) in 
Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figures 21-25 represent the causes of the interruption events in Petroleum Refining (PR) 
industries in Texas during 2000-2004. Figures show  
• Equipment failure is the number one cause of incidents associated with:  
• Startup/Shutdown (53%) 
• Process Upset (81%) 
• Power Failure (69%)  
• Fire and Explosion (68%) and 
• Second most cause of Maintenance (32%) 
• Intentional or illegal acts are the number one  cause of 
• Maintenance Event(52%) and  
• second most cause of Startup/Shutdown (22%) incidents 
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• Operator Error is associated with few numbers of incidents: 
• Startup/Shutdown (2%),  
• Maintenance (1%),  
• Power Failure (3%), and  
• Process Upset (2%), 
• Fire and Explosion (8%)  
• 16% of Power Failure (PF) incidents occurred due to bad weather (BW): second 
most frequent cause. 
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Figure 26. Distribution of startup/shutdown events by cause for Plastic, Synthetic and Resin (PSR) 
Industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 27. Distribution of maintenance events by cause for Plastic, Synthetic and Resin (PSR) Industries 
in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 28. Distribution of process upset events by cause for Plastic, Synthetic and Resin (PSR) Industries 
in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 29. Distribution of power failure events by cause for Plastic, Synthetic and Resin (PSR) Industries 
in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 30. Distribution of fire and explosion events by cause for Plastic, Synthetic and Resin (PSR) 
Industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figures 26-30 represent the causes of the interruption events in Petroleum Refining (PR) 
industries in Texas during 2000-2004. Figures show  
• Equipment failure is the number one cause of incidents associated with:  
• Startup/Shutdown (43%) 
• Process Upset (73%) 
• Power Failure (69%)  
• Fire and Explosion (76%) and 
• Second most cause of Maintenance (34%) 
• Intentional or illegal acts are the number one  cause of 
• Maintenance Event(47%) and  
• Second most cause of Startup/Shutdown (30%) incidents 
• Operator Error is associated with few numbers of incidents: 
• Startup/Shutdown (2%),  
• Maintenance (2%),  
• Power Failure (4%), and  
• Process Upset (3%), 
• Fire and Explosion (13%)  
• 13% of  Power Failure (PF )incidents occurred due to bad weather (BW): second 
most frequent cause 
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Figure 31. Distribution of comparison events by cause for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas                
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 31 shows the causes of comparison events of IMC, PR and PSR industries during 
2000-2004 in Texas. The contributing factors of the comparison events for the Industrial 
and Miscellaneous Chemical industries are:  
• Equipment Failure (59%) 
• Operator Error (11%) 
• Process Upset (10%) 
• Maintenance (6%) 
• Startup/Shutdown (5%) 
• Bad Weather (3%) 
• Power Failure (2%) 
• Intentional or Illegal act (1%) 
• Others (3%) 
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The contributing factors of the comparison events for the Petroleum Refining industries 
are: 
• Equipment Failure (52%) 
• Operator Error (6%) 
• Process Upset (15%) 
• Maintenance (6%) 
• Startup/Shutdown (10%) 
• Power Failure (2%) 
• Bad Weather (3%) 
• Others (5%) 
 
The contributing factors of the comparison events for the Plastic, Synthetic and Resin 
industries are: 
• Equipment Failure (59%) 
• Operator Error (12%) 
• Process Upset (6%) 
• Maintenance (8%) 
• Startup/Shutdown (7%) 
• Bad Weather (2%) 
• Power Failure (2%) 
• Intentional or Illegal act (1%) 
• Others (4%) 
 
Cause analysis shows that there are some common contributing factors of the incidents 
in the three industries. Equipment failure is the number one cause of process SS, PU, PF, 
and F&E events in all the three industries. Intentional or illegal acts are the number one 
cause of maintenance incidents in the three industries. This is because when people want 
to perform maintenance, it is not human error or equipment failure that causes the 
release.  
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They are fully aware that their actions will cause a release above permitted quantities (so 
it is intentional) and many times report them in advance to get a waiver (because they 
have a waiver it is not illegal). After equipment failure, bad weather (BW) is the second 
most contributing factor for power failure (PF) events for all the three industries. 
Comparison events are more frequently caused by operator error and less frequently 
caused by intentional or illegal acts. Whereas, interruption events are more frequently 
caused by intentional or illegal acts and less frequently caused by operator errors.   
 
 
 
7.7.  Area/Equipment Distribution 
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Figure 32. Distribution of incidents by area/equipment for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas        
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
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Figure 32 represents Areas/Equipment involved during the incidents for three industries.   
It can be concluded that the Area/Equipment involved in the Industrial and 
Miscellaneous Chemical industries are:   
• Ancillary process equipment (APE) (47%) 
• Process vessel (PV) (24%) 
• Pipe (16%) 
• Storage above the ground (SAG) (6%) 
• Material handling area (MHA) (2%) 
• Dump/Waste area (DA/WA) (1%) 
• Incinerator (INCIN) (2%) 
• Other (2%) 
Area/Equipment involved in the Petroleum Refining industries is:   
• Ancillary process equipment (65%) 
• Process vessel (19%) 
• Pipe (10%) 
• Storage above the ground (4%) 
• Material handling area (1%) 
• Incinerator (1%) 
• Other (1%) 
Area/Equipment involved in the Plastic, Synthetic and Resin industries are:   
• Ancillary process equipment (45%) 
• Process vessel (34%) 
• Pipe (14%) 
• Storage above the ground (4%) 
• Material handling area (1%) 
• Other (2%) 
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7.8. Chemical Distribution 
Table 6. Cumulative data by year for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas (source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
No. incidents 
 with Victims 
Year 
Facility  
Type 
Incidents 
No. of 
Substances 
No. of 
Victims 
No. of 
Death 
No. 
% of incidents  
with victims 
2000 867 877 20 0 6 0.69% 
2001 904 909 67 0 9 1.00% 
2002 993 999 19 0 4 0.40% 
2003 841 859 16 1 5 0.59% 
2004 653 669 8 1 3 0.46% 
Total 
IMC 
 
4258 4313 130 2 27 0.63% 
2000 463 464 10 0 2 0.43% 
2001 523 535 28 0 4 0.76% 
2002 643 643 1 0 1 0.16% 
2003 743 743 17 0 1 0.13% 
2004 595 596 12 0 1 0.17% 
Total 
PR 
 
2967 2981 68 0 9 0.30% 
2000 384 395 92 1 3 0.78% 
2001 334 340 7 0 10 2.99% 
2002 480 483 8 0 2 0.42% 
2003 487 489 1 0 1 0.21% 
2004 346 348 2 0 1 0.29% 
Total 
PSR 
2031 2055 110 1 17 0.84% 
 
 
Table 6 shows the number of substances released, number of victims, number of 
fatalities and number of events with victims associated with the incident for IMC, PR 
and PSR industries during 2000-2004.  
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Figure 33. Distribution of events by substances released, victims for IMC, PR and PSR manufacturing 
industries incidents in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 33 represents the number of substances released; victims associated with 
incidents for the IMC, PR and PSR industries during 2002-2004 in Texas. This figure 
shows that the number of chemicals released is greater than the number of incidents 
because one incident could have more than one chemicals released.  
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Figure 34. Distribution of events by substance category and associated victims for Industrial and 
Miscellaneous Chemical (IMC) industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
The most frequently released substances for IMC industries are: 
• Mixtures 52% 
• Inorganic substances 18% 
• Volatile organic compounds 18% 
• Agricultural chemical and pesticide 2% 
• Acid 2% 
• Ammonia 2% 
• Bases 1% 
• Other 3% 
• Unknown 2% 
Figure 34 represents incidents associated with mixtures have the highest number of 
victims.  
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Figure 35. Distribution of events by substance category and associated victims for Petroleum Refining 
(PR) industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
The most frequently released substances for PR industries are:  
• Mixtures 46% 
• Inorganic substances 39% 
• Volatile organic compounds 11% 
• Acid 1% 
• Ammonia 1.31% 
• Other 0.67% 
• Unknown 0.47% 
Figure 35 represents incidents associated with mixtures have the highest number of 
victims.  
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Figure 36.  Distribution of events by substance category and associated victims for Plastic, Synthetic and 
Resin (PSR) industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
The most frequently released substances for PSR industries are: 
• Mixtures 48% 
• Inorganic substances 20% 
• Volatile organic compounds 22% 
• Ammonia 2% 
• Agricultural chemical and pesticide 1% 
• Acid 1% 
• Base 0.4% 
• Chlorine 0.4% 
• Other 4% 
• Unknown 2% 
 Figure 36 represents incidents associated with other chemicals, VOC and inorganic 
substances have the highest number of victims. 
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Figure 37. Distribution of events by release location of different chemicals for Industrial and 
Miscellaneous Chemical Industries in Texas. (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 37 represents the location of the released chemicals for the IMC industries during 
2000-2004 in Texas.  Percentage of different chemicals released associated with the 
percentage of the release locations given below: 
• Acid (2%): Pipe 47%, process vessel (PV) 11%, storage below the ground (SBG) 
10%, ancillary process equipment (APE) 8%, storage above the ground (SAG) 
9%, material handling area (MHA) 6%, other 2% 
• Ammonia (2%): SBG 26%,  APE 24%, Pipe 24%,  PV 19%, SAG 4%, MHA 3%  
• Base (1%): Pipe 27%, PV 25% , SAG 15%, SBG 12%, Other 10%, MHA 7% 
• Inorganic Substances (18%): APE 63%, PV 25%, pipe 7%, SAG 2%, SBG 1% 
• Volatile organic compound (VOC) (18%): APE 35%, Pipe 24%, PV 19%, SAG 
8%, SBG 6%,WA 3%  
• Mixture (52%): APE 52%, PV 26%, Pipe 13%, SAG 3%, SBG 1%, MHA 1% 
• Agricultural chemical and pesticide (Ag. Chem.) 2% : APE 23%, Pipe 24%, PV 
18%, Incinerator 16%, SAG 11% 
• Chlorine (0.44% : Pipe 68%, PV 11%, APE 5%, MHA 5%, SBG 5% 
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Figure 38. Distribution of events by release location of different chemicals for Petroleum and Refining 
(PR) industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 38 represents the location of the released chemicals for the PR industries during 
2000-2004 in Texas. Percentage of different chemicals released associated with the 
percentage of the release locations given below: 
• Mixture (46%): APE 66%, PV 20%, Pipe 10%, SAG 2% 
• Inorganic substances (39%): APE 73%, PV 19%, Pipe 6%, SAG 1%,  
• VOC (11%): APE 73%, Pipe 20%, PV18%, SAG 16%, WA 3% 
• Ammonia (1.31%): APE 85%, PV 13%, Pipe 3% 
• Acid (1%): Pipe 50%, MHA 14%,  PV 11%,  SAG 11%, APE 7% 
• Base (0.44%): Pipe 46%, SAG 31%, , APE 15%, PV 8% 
• Chlorine (0.13%): SAG 75%,  Pipe 25% 
• Other (47%): SAG 30%, Pipe 25%, APE 15%, Pipe 10%, PV 5% 
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Figure 39. Distribution of events by release location of different chemicals for 
Plastic, Synthetic and Resin industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 39 represents the location of the released chemicals for the Plastic, Synthetic and 
Resin industries during 2000-2004 in Texas. Percentage of different chemicals released 
associated with the percentage of the release locations given below: 
• Mixture (48%): APE 50%, PV 34%, Pipe 11%, SAG 2% 
• VOC (23%): APE 39%, PV 28%, Pipe 21%, MHA 2% 
• Inorganic Substances (20%): APE 48%, PV 46%, Pipe 4% 
• Other (4%): Pipe 31%, PV 25%, APE 18%, SAG 17%, Other 7% 
• Unknown (2%): Pipe 36%, APE 34%, PV 14%, SAG 14%, WA 2% 
• Ammonia (2%): APE 52%, PV 29%, Pipe 14%, Other 5%, SAG 2% 
• Acid (1%): SAG 57%, Pipe 29%,  PV 7%, MHA 7% 
• Base (0.4%): Pipe 38%, SAG 38%,  APE 13% 
• Chlorine (0.4%): Pipe 38%, SAG 38%, APE 13%, WA 13%, PV 13% 
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Figure 40. Distribution of most chemical release by substances name and associated release amount, 
victims in the IMC industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2001) 
 
From Figure 40 it can be concluded that for IMC industries in Texas 
• Chemicals released with the highest amounts are CO, Ethylene, mixture, NaOH, 
Sulfuric acid , sulfur dioxide, CCl4, hydrogen sulfide, and ethylenediamine  
• Victims associated with chemicals: ammonia, mixture, H2S04, and 
ethylenediamine 
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Figure 41.  Distribution of most chemical release by substances name and associated release amount, 
victims in the PR industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2001) 
 
Figure 41 represents distribution of most chemical releases by substance name and 
associated release amount, victims for the PR industries in Texas during 2000-2002. The 
highest amounts of chemicals released are Ammonia, CO, Carbon Black, Ethylene, 
Mixture: H2S/Nitric oxide/S02, Mixture: H2S/S02, Sulfuric Acid, Sulfur dioxide, 
Hydrogen sulfide, and Nitrogen oxide (NOX). Sulfuric acid associated with the largest 
number of victims.  
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Figure 42.  Distribution of most chemical release by substance name and associated release amount, 
victims in the PSR industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2001) 
 
From Figure 42 it can be concluded for PSR industries in Texas that 
• Chemicals released with highest amounts: CO, Styrene, Vinyl Chloride, 
Cyclohexane, Ethylene, Propylene, Butadiene, Nitrogen dioxide, and Mixture: 
NH3/Oxides of N2 NOS 
• Victims associated with chemicals: Styrene, Butadiene, Cyclohexane, and 
Chlorine 
 
There are not many victims associated with those released chemicals, but the release 
amounts are high. This could have an adverse effect on the environment.  
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7.9. Victim Distribution 
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Figure 43.  Distribution of victims by population group in IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas     
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 43 represents distribution of victims, by population group for the IMC, PR and 
PSR industries in Texas during 200-2004.  
Type of victims for IMC, PR and PSR industries are given below: 
• IMC: Employee 38%, General public 47%, Volunteer firefighter 11%, 
Professional firefighter 3%, Responder 1% 
• PR:  Employee 44%, General public 28%, Employee is the member of the 
company response team 25%,  Professional firefighter 3% 
• PSR: Employee 86%, General public 4%, Employee is the member of the 
company response team 6%,   , Professional firefighter 4% 
 
Figure 43 shows the employees and the general public (G. public) are the most affected 
victims in those three industries. 
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7.10. Injury Distribution 
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Figure 44.  Distribution of type of injury in IMC, PR and PSR industries (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 44 represents distribution of type injury in IMC, PR and PSR industries during 
2000-2004 in Texas.  Type of injuries for IMC, PR and PSR industries are given below:  
• IMC: Respiratory irritation 29%, Eye 18%, Skin 15%, Chemical burn 9%,  
Headache 7%, Trauma 6%, Thermal burn 4%, Gastrointestinal problem 3% 
• PR: Respiratory irritation 38%, Gastrointestinal problem 14%, Chemical Burn 
13%, Dizziness 8%, Eye irritation 8%, Trauma 4%  
• PSR: Trauma 28%, Respiratory irritation 11%, Thermal burn 9%, Headache 8%, 
Shortness of breath 5%, Skin 3%, Dizziness 3%, other 23%.  
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7.11. Severity of Injury to Victims 
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Figure 45.  Distribution of victim severity in IMC, PR and PSR industries (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
 
Figure 45 shows the severity of victims for IMC, PR and PSR industries during 2000-
2004. The majority of victims were treated at a hospital and treated on the scene for 
those three industries.  
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Table 7. Selection of personal protective equipment (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Victims PPE Level Other PPE 
Facility 
Type Type No. 
Level 
"A" 
Level 
 "B" 
Level 
 "C" 
Level 
"D" Gloves Eye 
Hard 
 Hat Shoes FFTG other None 
Employee 30   3   23 3 1           
G. Public 19                     19 
P. Firefighter 2                 2     
EMRCT 17   3 1 8   1 1 1 4     
PR Total 68 0 6 1 31 3 2 1 1 6 0 19 
Employee 49 4 1 0 8 5 11 5 12     16 
G. Public 61 0 0 0 2 0 19 10 1   9 19 
P. Firefighter 4                 4     
V. Firefighter 14         5       7 1 1 
Responder 2       2               
IMC Total 130 4 1 0 12 10 30 15 13 11 10 36 
Employee 95 0 0 1 1 2 84 6 6 2 1 4 
G. Public 4                   4   
P. Firefighter 4                 4     
EMRCT 7           5     2     
PSR Total 110 0 0 1 1 2 89 6 6 8 5 4 
 
 
Table 7 represents the types of personal protective equipments that were used by victims 
during the incidents.  
The types of personal protective equipments used by workers are given below:  
• Level “D” 77%, level “B” 10%, gloves 10%, and eye protection 3% in the 
Petroleum Refining industries.  
• None 33%, steel-toed shoes 24%,  eye protection 22%, level “D” 16%,  level “A” 
8%, and level “B” 2% in the Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical industries.  
 
 
  
66 
 
 
• Eye protection 88%, hard hat 6%, steel-toed shoes 6%, level “C” 1%, level “D” 
1%, gloves 2%, firefighter turn-out gear 2%, and none 4% in the Plastic, 
Synthetic and Resin industries.  
 
The types of personal protective equipments used by general public are 
• 0% in the PR industries 
• Eye protection 31%, level “D” 3%, hard hat 16%, other 15% and none 31% in 
the IMC industries.  
• Other (Firefighter turn-out gear without respiratory protection) 100% in the PSR 
industries.  
Most of the firefighters used firefighter turn-out gear during the emergency situation. 
Appropriate personal protective equipments (PPE) should be used when handling 
hazardous chemicals. Level A should be used when the greatest level of skin, 
respiratory, and eye protection is required. Level B should be used when highest 
level of respiratory protection is needed. Level C should be used when the 
concentrations and types of airborne substances are known.  
 
7.12. Evacuation Distribution  
Table 8. Distribution of incidents by evacuation (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Evacuation Location 
Industry 
Type 
Incident 
NO. % 
PPL 
Evacuated 
Avg. Hrs of 
Evacuation 
No 
defined 
Criteria 
Circle 
/Radius 
Downstream 
Affected 
Building 
Circle 
& 
Downwind 
IMC 4258 28 0.66 4595 2.8 2 5 3 17 1 
PR 2967 11 0.37 885 18.8 0 2 3 6 0 
PSR 2031 5 0.25 670 3.8 0 2 1 2 0 
 
  
67 
 
 
Table 8 represents the incidents with evacuation and associated number of people 
evacuated, hours of evacuation, and location of evacuation in IMC, PR and PSR 
industries in Texas.  
• Evacuations were ordered in 28 (0.66%) events in IMC industries involving 4595 
people with an average 2.8 hours of evacuation.  
• Evacuations were ordered in 11 (0.37%) events in PR industries involving 885 
people with an average 18.8 hours of evacuation.  
• Evacuations were ordered in 5 (0.25%) events in PSR industries involving 670 
people with an average 3.8 hours of evacuation.  
Most of the evacuation events were from a building or affected part of the building in 
those industries.  
 
7.13. National Estimation 
HSEES does not cover all the incidents in the US. Only thirteen to sixteen states 
participate in the HSEES incident reporting system. HSEES doesn’t include petroleum 
related incidents. The HSEES data cover only 37% incidents in the US. This multiplier 
or Scaling ratio is used to estimate the total universe size which is shown in the table 9. 
 
Table 9. National estimation of incidents (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Year 
Total Incidents  
 HSEES Database 
Scaling 
Ratio 
Total Incidents 
 National Estimate 
2000 7548 20380 
2001 8978 24241 
2002 9014 24338 
2003 9105 24584 
2004 8111 
2.7 
21900 
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CHAPTER   VIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Most of the incidents that are shown in the table 11 occurred in fixed facilities during 
1993-2004. However, the number of transportation-related incidents has increased since 
data collection began. A majority of the fixed facility manufacturing incidents occurred 
in the Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical (IMC) 55%, Petroleum Refining (PR) 25% 
and Plastic, Synthetic and Rubber (PSR) 15% industries during 2000-2004 in Texas.  
Texas counties along the gulf coast are highly industrialized and account for the largest 
number of incidents. Harris and surrounding counties account for 69% of the fixed 
facility manufacturing incidents in the Texas. The rate of incidents of Petroleum 
industries is higher than IMC and PSR industries.  Some of the important points from the 
analysis are given below: 
 
• Equipment failure is the major cause for both the interruption and comparison 
events. This study shows that majority of the incidents occurred involved 
ancillary process equipment, process vessels, and piping (Figure 32). Areas 
for further investigation should include equipment failures as the “primary” 
cause of the incidents. The definition of equipment used in the HSEES 
database is broad; therefore future study should focus on specific equipment 
failure. HSEES needs to collect detailed descriptions of the equipment. 
Database integration is an important step towards a comprehensive database. 
Information from different databases for the same incidents can be compiled 
after cleaning, transforming and mining of variables to get an integrated 
database. There are other databases which have detailed description of the 
equipment which can be used for collecting equipment description. Future 
study should be focused on data integration methodologies to effectively 
collect and integrate the data.  
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• Comparison events were more frequently caused by human error and less 
frequently caused by intentional acts than interruption events. Operator error 
can be reduced by an effective training and human factor management 
program. Analysis showed that a large number of incidents took place during 
startup/shutdown, and maintenance time. Most of the time, startup/shutdown 
and maintenance are planned work and are considered to be relatively higher 
risk phases. Intentional act is the major contributing factor of these events.  
This is because when people want to perform maintenance or 
startup/shutdown, they are fully aware that their actions will cause a release 
above permitted quantities. Careful monitoring and planning should apply 
during startup/shutdown and maintenance time. Standard operating 
procedures or a checklist for processes and better training can prevent or 
reduce those releases. Maintenance should also be considered during the 
design phase, ensuring that maintenance operations can be safely performed 
while the plant operation continues.  
• Process upset is the number one interruption event occurring in those three 
industries. Study showed the rate of process upset events is higher than any 
other events. Equipment failure is the number one cause of the process upset 
events. 
•  Bad weather is the second most contributing factor of the power failure 
events in those three industries. Backup power generation system, improved 
process control engineering, and better emergency planning can reduce the 
power failure events. The role of weather should be further investigated.  
• More incidents occurred on weekdays than weekends in the IMC, PR and 
PSR industries. Most of the maintenance events occurred during shift 
changes and peaked during the 8 a.m-10 a.m. shift. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety Management (PSM) 
standard can keep reduce maintenance incidents if properly followed.  
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• A large percentage of injuries (IMC 30%, PR 38%, PSR 11%) involving 
respiratory irritation occurred among the workers (IMC 38%, PR 44%, and 
PSR 86%). Most of the workers involved in injuries during the incidents used 
level “D” type personal protective equipment, which provides minimal 
protection. It is really important to understand the nature of the chemicals 
while selecting PPE’s for employees. A majority of the injuries were 
associated with the release of mixture, inorganic substances, and volatile 
organic compounds.  Properties of mixtures such as reactivity, flammability, 
and toxicity must be studied to understand the nature of the releases. 
Industries should improve their emergency management plan and employee 
training program. Appropriate PPE should be selected based on the nature of 
the releases.  
• The petroleum refining industries took longer time for evacuation than the 
IMC and PSR industries. This study shows that most of the victims are 
employees and general public.  Better evacuation plans with plant and local 
emergency departments along with in-place sheltering can help Petroleum 
Refining industries effectively protect people in case of emergency.  
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• There are not many victims associated with released chemicals, but the 
release amounts are high which is shown in tables 29-31.  This could affect 
the environment and have long-term effects on public health. The 
environmental departments should be involved in this situation to outreach 
industries. It seems logical that large releases of pollutants to the environment 
are injuring a sensitive population (children, elderly, and asthmatics) which is 
an important issue.  
 
In this study, recommendations are given based on trend analysis, cause analysis and 
consequence analysis from the HSEES database. Learning from the past incidents can 
definitely reduce future incidents. Using the stored knowledge from incident databases 
can facilitate learning. However, case histories have no value unless it is studied, 
understood, and used properly.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 10. Acronyms and abbreviations 
Acronym Meaning 
IMC Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemicals 
Industry 
PR Petroleum and Refinery Industry 
PSR Plastic Synthetic and Resin Industry 
MF Manufacturing Event 
FF Fixed Facility 
T Transportation 
PV Process Vessel 
APE Ancillary Process Equipment 
WA/DA Waste Area/Dump Area 
MHA Material Handling Area 
SAG Storage Above the Ground 
SBG Storage Below the Ground 
INCIN Incinerator 
Unkn Unknown 
SS Startup and Shutdown 
ME Maintenance Event 
PU Process Upset 
PF Power Failure 
F&E Fire and Explosion 
EF Equipment Failure 
OE Operator Error 
Inen. Act Intentional or illegal act 
BW Bad Weather 
VOC Volatile Organic Compound 
In. Subs Inorganic Substances 
Ag. Chem. Agriculture Chemical 
G. Public General Public 
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Table 10. Continued 
 
Acronym Meaning 
P. Firefighter Professional Firefighter  
GI Gastrointestinal problem 
SR Scaling Ratio 
EMCRT Employee is the member of the company response 
team 
FFTG Firefighter turn-out gear 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
HSEES Hazardous Substance Emergency Events Surveillance 
NRC National Response Center 
IRIS Incident Reporting Information System 
ERNS Emergency Response Notification System 
ARIP Accidental Release Information Program 
HMIRS Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting System 
HLPAD Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accident Database 
IMIS Integrated Management Information System 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
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Table 11. Incident distribution by year (source: HSEES, 1993-2004) 
Fixed Facility Event Transportation Event 
Year 
No. 
Participating 
State 
MF Texas 
% of  
total MF 
NonMF Total MF NonMF Total 
Total 
1993 11 1752 915 52.23 1447 3199 47 587 634 3833 
1994 12 1653 826 49.97 1668 3321 63 849 912 4233 
1995 14 2593 1589 61.28 1680 4273 55 982 1037 5310 
1996 14 2954 1958 66.28 1373 4327 51 1108 1159 5486 
1997 13 3114 2150 69.04 1271 4385 49 1079 1128 5513 
1998 13 3293 2297 69.75 1436 4729 63 1189 1252 5981 
1999 13 3084 1985 64.36 1550 4634 59 1567 1626 6260 
2000 15 3214 1846 57.44 2285 5499 81 1968 2049 7548 
2001 16 3672 1888 51.42 3064 6736 82 2160 2242 8978 
2002 15 3804 2202 57.89 2689 6493 100 2421 2521 9014 
2003 15 3774 2114 56.01 3008 6782 106 2217 2323 9105 
2004 
13+Part 
 AL,MS 
2982 1653 55.43 2921 5903 86 2122 2208 8111 
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Table 12. Incident distribution by industry type (Source: HSEES and U.S. Census Bureau, 1993-2004) 
 
Type of industry 
Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical 
(IMC) 
Petroleum Refining (PR) Plastic, Synthetic and Resin (PSR) 
SIC 281, 286, 289 SIC 291 SIC 282 
Year 
Total Fixed  
Facility MF 
Incidents 
Texas 
MF 
Incidents 
Incidents  % 
Indus 
tries 
Incident 
 Rate 
Incidents % 
Indus 
tries 
Incident  
Rate 
Incidents  % 
Indus 
tries 
Incident 
 Rate 
1993 1752 915 563 61.53 476 1.18 122 13.33 50 2.44 119 13.01 80 1.49 
1994 1653 826 454 54.96 474 0.96 119 14.41 51 2.33 153 18.52 78 1.96 
1995 2593 1589 817 51.42 485 1.68 457 28.76 54 8.46 182 11.45 85 2.14 
1996 2954 1958 1043 53.27 474 2.20 511 26.10 57 8.96 199 10.16 93 2.14 
1997 3114 2150 1269 59.02 509 2.49 428 19.91 50 8.56 288 13.40 89 3.24 
1998 3293 2297 1088 47.37 537 2.03 582 25.34 68 8.56 420 18.28 84 5.00 
1999 3084 1985 829 41.76 551 1.50 572 28.82 57 10.04 440 22.17 104 4.23 
2000 3214 1846 867 46.97 532 1.63 463 25.08 51 9.08 384 20.80 89 4.31 
2001 3672 1888 904 47.88 512 1.77 523 27.70 52 10.06 334 17.69 94 3.55 
2002 3804 2202 993 45.10 502 1.98 643 29.20 64 10.05 480 21.80 102 4.71 
2003 3774 2114 841 39.78 489 1.72 743 35.15 41 18.12 487 23.04 108 4.51 
2004 2982 1653 653 39.50 503 1.30 595 36.00 54 11.02 346 20.93 91 3.80 
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Table 13. Distribution of interruption events by cause for Industrial and Miscellaneous Chemical (IMC) industry in TX (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Cause Total 
Incident 
Type of 
Incident 
Incident 
E. Failure O. Error Inten. Act ME PF SS PU Bad Weather Other Unknown 
4258 SS 872 453 26 204 55 19 0 33 25 26 31 
4258 ME 404 128 23 192 0 0 17 6 1 1 36 
4258 PU 898 657 45 20 40 20 14 0 22 11 69 
4258 PF 171 90 8 1 0 0 0 3 49 9 11 
4258 F&E 39 28 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 4 2 
 
Table 14. Distribution of interruption events by cause for Petroleum Refining (PR) industry in TX (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Cause 
Total 
Incident 
Type of 
Incident 
Incident E. 
Failure 
O. 
Error 
Inten. 
Act 
ME PF SS PU 
Bad 
Weather 
Other Unknown 
2967 SS 521 273 10 115 15 12 0 19 10 6 61 
2967 ME 276 99 4 144 0 0 4 2 0 0 23 
2967 PU 997 801 18 26 17 23 7 0 23 13 69 
2967 PF 155 107 4 1 1 0 0 1 24 4 13 
2967 F&E 25 17 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 4 
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Table 15. Distribution of interruption events by cause for Plastic, Synthetic and Resin (PR) industry in TX (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Cause 
Total 
Incident 
Type of 
Incident 
Incident E. 
Failure 
O. 
Error 
Inten. 
Act 
ME PF SS PU 
Bad 
Weather 
Other Unknown 
2031 SS 410 178 8 125 30 9 0 9 13 3 35 
2031 ME 246 83 6 115 0 2 9 2 1 0 28 
2031 PU 507 368 15 10 18 10 8 0 9 9 60 
2031 PF 72 55 3 0 0 0 0 0 9 1 4 
2031 F&E 16 8 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 
 
Table 16. Distribution of comparison events by cause for IMC, PR and PSR industry in TX (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Cause 
Type of 
Industry 
Comparison 
Event E. Failure O. Error 
Inten. 
Act 
ME PF SS PU 
Bad 
Weather 
Other 
IMC 1874 1103 210 15 110 31 103 182 55 65 
PR 993 520 55 0 61 17 97 153 30 45 
PSR 780 463 91 7 64 12 51 48 13 31 
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Table 17. Distribution incidents by Area/Equipment for IMC, PR and PSR industry (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Type of 
Facility 
Type of 
Incident 
No. of 
Incident 
Process 
Vessel 
Ancillary 
Process 
Equipment 
(APE) 
Piping 
Material 
Handling 
Area 
(MHA) 
Storage 
Above 
the 
Ground 
(SAG) 
Dump 
Area 
(DA) 
Transformer 
or Capacitor 
Incinerator Other 
Interruption 2384 671 1285 262 14 65 12 7 46 22 
Comparison 1874 348 734 427 64 194 30 7 26 44 IMC 
Total 4258 1019 2019 689 78 259 42 14 72 66 
Interruption 1974 357 1387 166 3 32 2 4 14 9 
Comparison 993 206 529 134 13 78 11 1 6 15 PR 
Total 2967 563 1916 300 16 110 13 5 20 24 
Interruption 1251 488 608 114 0 22 2 4 5 8 
Comparison 780 195 313 167 16 62 5 1 2 19 PSR 
Total 2031 683 921 281 16 84 7 5 7 27 
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Table 18. Distribution of interruption and comparison events by month (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Type of 
Incident 
JAN FEB MAR APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total 
Interruption 452 395 429 465 459 500 478 450 419 527 533 502 5609 
Comparison 332 251 347 287 309 295 283 310 287 317 318 311 3647 
 
Table 19. Distribution of events by month for IMC, PR and PSR industry (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Type of 
Facility 
JAN FEB MAR APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Total 
IMC 374 292 363 361 340 349 335 382 351 387 365 359 4258 
PR 259 203 236 220 259 273 225 227 230 261 287 287 2967 
PSR 150 145 181 172 169 175 199 154 124 195 200 167 2031 
 
Time Distribution by Day 
 
Table 20. Distribution of events by day for IMC, PR and PSR industries (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Sat Sun Mon Tues Wed THR FRI Total 
1083 1036 1455 1455 1486 1410 1331 9256 
 
Table 21. Distribution of maintenance events by time for IMC, PR and PSR industries 
0:00
-
1:59 
2:00-
3:59 
4:00-
5:59 
6:00-
7:59 
8:00-
9:59 
10:00-
11:59 
12:00-
13:59 
14:00-
15:59 
16:00-
17:59 
18:00-
19:59 
20:00-
21:59 
22:00-
23:59 
Total 
74 53 48 95 139 98 81 100 62 55 59 62 926 
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Table 22. Distribution of events by number of chemical released for IMC, PR and PSR industries     
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
No of Chemical Released 
Facility Incidents 
1 2 3 4 5 6 11 13 
Total Chemical 
IMC 4258 4219 34 3 1 0 0 0 1 4313 
PR 2967 2961 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 2981 
PSR 2031 2019 10 0 0 1 0 1 0 2055 
 
 
Table 23. Distribution of events by release locations of different chemicals and associated victims for 
IMC industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Location of Release 
Chemical 
Categories 
No. of 
incidents 
No. of 
Incidents 
With Victims 
No. of 
Victims PV Pipe APE MHA SAG SBG WA INCIN Other 
Acid 89 5 13 10 42 7 5 8 9 0 0 2 
Ammonia 70 2 9 13 17 17 2 3 18 1 0 0 
Base 60 3 44 15 16 2 4 9 7 2 0 6 
Chlorine 19 1 1 2 13 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Inorganic 
substances 
760 2 21 187 52 481 7 12 8 2 8 9 
VOC 774 5 26 144 184 274 18 62 46 22 6 25 
Mixture 2221 10 47 579 295 1165 26 70 30 6 40 28 
Ag. 
Chemicals 
Pesticides 
92 1 10 17 22 21 1 10 4 2 15 0 
Other 141 2 2 52 28 28 8 10 14 3 3 2 
Unknown 84 1 1 18 23 18 5 11 0 4 0 2 
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Table 24. Distribution of events by release locations of different chemicals and associated victims for PR 
industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Location of Release 
Chemical 
Categories 
No. of 
Incidents 
No. of 
incidents With 
Victims 
No. of 
Victims PV Pipe APE MHA SAG WA INCIN Other 
Acid 28 1 4 3 14 2 4 3 0 0 0 
Ammonia 39 0 0 33 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 
Base 13 0 0 1 6 2 0 4 0 0 0 
Chlorine 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Inorganic 
substances 
1175 2 5 219 69 856 0 12 0 12 7 
VOC 328 1 2 58 67 125 5 53 10 1 9 
Mixture 1359 6 44 277 139 894 3 26 3 7 10 
Other 20 1 2 1 5 3 2 6 0 0 3 
Unknown 14 1 17 2 3 2 2 6 1 0 0 
 
Table 25. Distribution of events by release locations of different chemicals and associated victims for PSR 
industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Location of Release Chemical 
Categories 
No. of 
Incidents 
No. of incidents 
With Victims 
No. of 
Victims PV Pipe APE MHA SAG WA INCIN Other 
Acid 28 1 4 3 14 2 4 3 0 0 0 
Ammonia 39 0 0 33 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 
Base 13 0 0 1 6 2 0 4 0 0 0 
Chlorine 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Inorganic 
substances 
1175 2 5 219 69 856 0 12 0 12 7 
VOC 328 1 2 58 67 125 5 53 10 1 9 
Mixture 1359 6 44 277 139 894 3 26 3 7 10 
Other 20 1 2 1 5 3 2 6 0 0 3 
Unknown 14 1 17 2 3 2 2 6 1 0 0 
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Table 26. Distribution of events by type of victim for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas            
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Industry 
Employ
ee 
Responder 
General 
Public 
Profe- 
ssional 
Firefighter 
Volunteer 
Firefighter 
EMCRT Total 
IMC 49 2 61 4 14 0 130 
PR 30 0 19 2 0 17 68 
PSR 95 0 4 4 0 7 110 
 
 
 
Table 27. Distribution of events by severity of victim for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas            
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
TYPE IMC PR PSR Total 
Death 1 0 1 2 
Treated on scene 31 29 36 96 
Treated at Hospital (Admitted) 65 21 57 143 
Treated at Hospital 
( Not Admitted) 11 0 15 26 
Observation at Hospital, 
No treatment 
4 7 0 11 
Seen by private Physician 
within 24hrs 
12 4 1 17 
Adverse Health Effects 
experienced within 24 hrs 
6 7 0 13 
Total 130 68 110 308 
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Table 28. Distribution of events by type injury for IMC, PR and PSR industries in Texas 
(Source: HSEES, 2000-2004) 
Injury Type IMC PR PSR 
Trauma 13 3 57 
Respiratory 61 30 22 
Eye 37 6 5 
Gastrointestinal system 7 11 4 
Heat Stress 3 4 1 
Chemical Burn 19 10 6 
Thermal Burn 8 2 19 
Skin 31 1 7 
Dizziness or other 
central nervous system 
5 6 6 
Headache 14 1 16 
Heart problems 1 1 4 
Shortness of Breath 3 3 11 
Other 6 2 46 
Total 208 80 204 
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Table 29. Distribution of most chemical release by substance name and associated release amount, victims 
for IMC industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2001) 
Name 
No.  of 
events 
Max(LB) Avg.(LB) Min(LB) Victim 
 
Acrolein 34 19 3.4 1 0 
Ammonia 32 9124 739.4 13 3 
Benzene 9 6750 337 6750 0 
Butadiene 38 2757 109.5 9 0 
Carbon Black 11 10 467.8 4400 0 
Carbon Monoxide 19 99000 23531.2 10 0 
Carbon Tetrachloride 10 8764 1404.5 14 0 
Chlorine 7 570 227.7 39 1 
Chlorodifluormethane 20 3000 900.2 26 0 
Ethylene 13 18200 7981.3 260 0 
Hydrogen Sulfide 18 6834 794 99 0 
Mixture 880 10 7971 10 30 
Nitric Oxide 189 4145 653 9 0 
Nitrogen dioxide 11 7234 574 9 0 
Nitrogen oxide (NOX) 18 1238 231.5 11 0 
Oxide of Nitrogen 
NOS 
75 10692 577.6 12 0 
Sodium Hydroxide 23 135460 15423.5 70 0 
Sulfur Dioxide 58 89083 6330 9 1 
Sulfuric Acid 23 166500 16777.7 100 2 
Vinyl Chloride 11 3000 340.4 2 0 
Ethylenediamine 1 13000 13000 13000 23 
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Table 30. Distribution of most chemical release by substance name and associated release amount, victims 
for PR industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2001) 
Name 
No. of 
Events 
Max(LB) Avg. (LB) Min (LB) Victim 
Ammonia 7 15095 3673.1 313 0 
Benzene 39 900 83.2 10 0 
Butadiene 21 763 155.3 11 0 
Carbon Black 3 21504 7658 210 0 
Carbon Monoxide 9 90517 26050.7 11050 0 
Ethylene 4 13260 6536.3 126 0 
Hydrogen Sulfide 34 15154 1083.2 99 0 
Mix: H2S,Nitric oxide, 
S02 
9 71793 23775.5 4024 0 
Mix: Nitric/Nitrogen di 
oxide 
11 1683 248.3 9 0 
Mix: Nitric/Sulfur di oxide 33 9234 3115 12 0 
Mix: H2S/S02 63 66264 14369 25 0 
Nitric Oxide 77 5430 227.2 9 0 
Nitrogen dioxide 29 5340 346.1 9 0 
Nitrogen oxide (NOX) 11 3522 703.1 10 0 
Oxide of Nitrogen NOS 67 3418 565 11  
Sulfur Dioxide 105 71441 5263.3 9 0 
Sulfuric Acid 10 2561.568 2561.6 138.2 4 
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Table 31. Distribution of most chemical release by substance name and associated release amount, victims 
for PSR industries in Texas (Source: HSEES, 2000-2001) 
Name 
No. of 
Events 
Max (LB) Avg.(LB) Min (LB) Victim 
Ammonia 18 837 246.2 26 0 
Benzene 22 934 185.6 14 0 
Butadiene 35 11492 529.8 11 91 
Chlorine 3 300 111.3 16 1 
Carbon Monoxide 6 21489 7810.2 591 0 
Chlorodifluormethane 7 10500 3533 150 0 
Cyclohexane 6 25454 5827.3 150 90 
Ethylene 18 15500 4779.9 50 0 
MIX: Ammonia/Oxides of 
Nitrogen NOS 
16 1350 699.4 44 0 
MIX: Benzene/Butadiene 11 621 213.4 28 0 
Nitric Oxide 24 307 74.7 11 0 
Nitrogen dioxide 18 1425 331.3 14 0 
Nitrogen oxide (NOX) 8 50 27.3 11 0 
Oxide of Nitrogen NOS 54 2778 239.4 12 0 
Propylene 23 4347 739 17 0 
Styrene 3 8905 5353 1801 94 
Vinyl Chloride 28 7058 379.9 1 0 
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